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ABSTRACT 
In  this  chapter  we  examine  the  role  of  the  CFO  in  setting  risk  management  strategy  with  respect  to 
macroeconomic risk, in particular, and we consider the information requirements for setting a strategy that is 
consistent with corporate objectives. We argue that macroeconomic risk management requires a broad approach 
encompassing financial, operational and strategic considerations. Furthermore, several interdependent sources of 
risk in the  macroeconomic environment  must be taken into account. Once this interdependence among,  for 
example, exchange rates, interest rates and inflation are taken into account macroeconomic risk management can 
be  considered  a  relatively  self-contained  aspect  of  Integrated  Risk  Management  (IRM)  provided  relevant 
information is available to management. Financial risk management cannot be considered a self-contained part 
of  macroeconomic  risk  management,  however,  since  value  increasing  investments  in  flexibility  of  business 
operations affect corporate exposure and make it uncertain.  
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The sub-prime loan crisis and subsequent economic and financial turmoil have directed the 
spotlight on the key-role of the chief financial officer (CFO) in developing a comprehensive 
risk  management  strategy.  The  turmoil  has  also  focused  attention  on  the  link  between 
corporate- and risk management strategies, and, in particular, the CFO´s role as member of 
the top level management team. 
In this chapter we examine the role of the CFO in setting risk management strategy 
with  respect  to  macroeconomic  risk,  in  particular,  and  we  consider  the  information 
requirements for setting a strategy that is consistent with corporate objectives. We argue that 
macroeconomic  risk  management  requires  a  broad  approach  encompassing  financial, 
operational and strategic considerations. Furthermore, several interdependent sources of risk 
in the macroeconomic environment must be taken into account. Once this interdependence 
among,  for  example,  exchange  rates,  interest  rates  and  inflation  are  taken  into  account 
macroeconomic  risk  management  can  be  considered  a  relatively  self-contained  aspect  of 
Integrated  Risk  Management  (IRM)  provided  relevant  information  is  available  to 
management. 
Rapidly increasing economic and financial integration has made more or less all firms 
exposed  to  events  in  the  global  economic  arena.  This  exposure  creates  risk  as  well  as 
opportunities.  Risk  management  strategies  must  be  shaped  with  an  awareness  of  their 
potential contributions as well as costs relative to corporate objectives. Relevant, up to date 
information is not always readily available to financial managers. Thus, the feasibility of risk 
management  strategies  may  be  constrained  by  the  availability  of  information  and  the 
interaction  between  the  finance  and  other  divisions.  The  evaluation  of  risk  management 
strategies  and  the  performance  of  the  finance  division  present  additional  information 
problems. 
The responsibility of the CFO has gradually been extended to encompass strategic 
aspects (Mian 2001; CFO Research Service 2005; Accenture 2007; CFO Research Service 
2007). The trend towards viewing financial polices as inseparable from corporate strategy has 
become evident in the risk management literature. “Holistic” risk management approaches, 
such as IRM and enterprise risk management (ERM), include a wide variety of strategic, 3 
 
 
operational and financial decisions among the instruments for managing risk (see Shapiro and 
Titman 1986; Miller 1992; Miller 1998; Meulbroek 2002; Nocco and Stulz 2006). 
Traditional  approaches  to  managing,  for  example,  exchange  rate  risk  focused  on 
transaction- and translation exposures and relied on accounting data to a great extent. Effects 
of exchange rate changes on cash flows through price and sales effects were rarely considered 
(Miller 1998; Oxelheim and Wihlborg 2008). Traditional approaches to managing interest rate 
risk were similarly limited to managing risk of interest rate linked financial positions. Interest 
rate changes may affect corporate cash flows through non-financial channels as well. Using 
these traditional measures of exchange-and interest rate exposures, hedging activities were 
performed tactically rather than strategically employing financial instruments directly linked 
to  these  exposures.  Any  link  between  exchange  rates  and  interest  rates  or  any  other 
macroeconomic variable were not taken into account. The exposure of commercial cash flows 
to these variables was not within the information set of the risk managers. 
IRM is a comprehensive framework for managing risk exposures and includes the 
identification,  measurement  and  evaluation  of  all  kinds  of  risk  and  the  possible  linkages 
among them. Meulbroek (2002) divides total risk into seven categories; financial-, product 
market-,  operational-,  input-,  tax-,  regulatory-  and  legal  risk.  An  IRM  strategy  utilizes 
financial  instruments,  insurance,  contractual  relations  with  stakeholders,  operational 
adjustment, capital structure as well strategic adjustment. 
Research is short of studies supporting the notion of IRM being superior to traditional 
risk management in value creation in non-financial firms (see Hoyt and Liebenberg 2009). 
Some researchers claim that the firm-wide implementation of IRM is in itself a source of 
value, due to the increasing awareness of risk exposures throughout a firm (Nocco and Stulz 
2006).  On  the  other  hand,  many  studies  accentuate  the  problems  surrounding  the 
implementation.  Meulbroek  (2002)  emphasizes  the  challenges  related  to  the  coordination 
between  different  parts  of  a  firm.  Nocco  and  Stulz  (2006)  stress  the  difficulties  in 
communicating  the  strategy  throughout  a  firm.  CFO  Research  Service  (2002)  show  that 
inadequate information systems are one of the main barriers to implementing a strategic risk 
management program. A survey from 2005 shows that CFOs have insufficient information to 
support  strategic  decision-making  (CFO  Research  Service  2005).  Hence,  prior  research 
indicates  that  the  information  issue  is  critical  for  more  comprehensive  risk  management 
strategies to create value. 4 
 
 
  Macroeconomic  risk  analysis  as  defined  in  this  chapter  takes  its  starting  point  in 
macroeconomic sources of risk and the broad impact of these sources on financial-, product 
market-,  operational  and  input  exposures.  We  argue  that  a  firm  must  approach  the 
macroeconomic  exposures  through  a  comprehensive  framework,  more  specifically  the 
MUST-analysis, recognizing the firm wide effects of macroeconomic variables as well as the 
interdependence among them. The MUST-analysis as developed in Oxelheim and Wihlborg 
(2008) measures the exposure of commercial operations in a multivariate framework in order 
to obtain a benchmark for management of financial positions. Risk-management incorporates 
adjustment of commercial operations in order to, for example, create flexibility (real options) 
as well as of financial positions including capital structure. The risk management strategy in 
MUST is  subordinated to  corporate strategy and objectives.  The information  required for 
implementation of a macroeconomic risk strategy will be discussed below.  
  The MUST-analysis also provides management with information of value for strategic 
analysis.  A  firm´s  cash  flow  can  be  divided  into  a  macroeconomic  and  an  “intrinsic” 
component that reflects the firm’s competitiveness based on its strategic assets. (see Oxelheim 
and Wihlborg 2008).  
  The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the role of the 
CFO  within  the  decision  making  structure  of  a  firm.  In  section  3  we  define  the 
macroeconomic  environment  of  a  firm  and,  thereby,  the  identification  of  macroeconomic 
exposures as a relatively self-contained subset of a firm’s total risk-exposure. In section 4 we 
discuss  how  a  risk-management  strategy  can  be  formulated.  Information  requirements 
associated with different strategies and their evaluation are discussed in section 5. Concluding 
remarks follow in section 6.  
 
2 The CFO and levels of decision-making 
The CFO is responsible for formulating and implementing policy decisions linked to a firm’s 
financial  system.  CFO’s  field  of  responsibility  encompasses  a  number  of  functions,  as 
financial  reporting,  cost  management,  budgeting,  financing,  risk  management,  investment 
management, treasury and tax management, and financial strategy. 
Concerning financial reporting, i.e. internal and external accounting, the CFO is in 
general  responsible  for  supervising  the  process  of  making  financial  reports  and  for  the 
external communication of the firm’s financial strategy and decisions (Mian 2001). Besides 5 
 
 
financial reporting, and to some extent cost management and budgeting, the majority of the 
functions in the financial system relates to the treasury side. The treasury components are 
highly  interconnected,  which  from  a  decision-making  point  of  view  emphasizes  the 
importance of having an adequate information system in place. This issue becomes even more 
important in large firms where the operational implementation of decisions related to financial 
policies is carried out by several departments on different levels. 
In addition to the primary responsibility of the financial system, several surveys show 
that the CFO to an increasing extent is involved in the development and implementation of a 
firm’s commercial strategy (CFO Research Service 2005; Accenture 2007; CFO Research 
Service 2007). In a survey conducted 2007 by Accenture 83% of the CFOs indicate that they 
are  active  in  formulating  corporate  strategies  and  95%  of  the  CFO’s  are  involved  in  the 
implementation  process.  The  financial  and  corporate  strategies  should  be  seen  as 
interconnected. An IRM approach requires the CFO to be involved in both the financial- and 
commercial  strategy  since  the  firm’s  commercial  strategy  represents  an  explicit  tool  for 
managing risk exposures in IRM. 
Corporate decision-making from a risk management perspective can be illustrated as 
in Figure 1 from Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2008). There are three levels of decision-making; 
top management level, tactical level and operational level. Top management - the board of 
directors and the chief executive officer (CEO) - formulates the general financial policies of a 
firm  along  with  the  commercial  strategy.  Even  if  the  CFO’s  formal  responsibility  lies 
primarily on the tactical level, the role still incorporates an advisory function on the top level. 
From  a  risk  management  point  of  view  an  important  consideration  is  that  overall  firm 
objectives determined on the top level and specific risk management objectives determined on 
the tactical level are consistent. One way top management can achieve consistency is through 
its  responsibility  for  designing  appropriate  compensation  schemes  and  for  performance 
evaluation of the tactical level, including the CFO, head of sales etc. 
The  CFO’s  responsibility  on  the  tactical  level  is  to  make  the  overall  strategies 
operational and to manage their implementation. From the CFO’s perspective this involves 
formulating an operational risk management strategy in accordance with the general strategy 
set by top level management. More specifically, determining risk levels, picking the most 
convenient  methods  and  tools,  and  actively  manage  exposures.  The  operational  level  is 
accountable for carrying out the tasks inherent in the operational strategy formulated by the 







Figure 1. Levels of decision-making in risk management 
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An  important  aspect  to  consider  in  Figure  1  is  the  information  flow  between  top 
management and the tactical level, as well as between departments and individuals on the 
tactical  and  operational  level.  The  operational  success  of  a  risk  management  strategy  is 
contingent  on  the  distribution  of  responsibility,  incentives  of  decision  makers  and  the 
adequacy of the information system supporting the chosen strategy. The responsibility for 
commercial and financial decisions has to be clearly defined and allocated on the tactical 
level.  For  example,  if  the  head  of  sales  is  responsible  for  adjusting  the  product  mix  on 
different markets, an information channel between the CFO and head of sales must exist since 
a change in the product mix may translate into a change in commercial exposure and, thereby, 
the exposure and hedging targets for financial positions. 
The interconnection between commercial and financial strategies becomes apparent in 
an IRM strategy and in the MUST-analysis. In a traditional risk management strategy it is 
sufficient  with  an information  system  supplying the CFO with  the information  needed to 7 
 
 
implement the strategy more or less in isolation from the corporate strategy, whereas the 
information need becomes more complex in the more comprehensive approach discussed in 
this chapter. The reason is that the commercial strategy, capital structure and financial risk 
management interact to determine risk exposures.  
 
3 The macroeconomic environment of the firm 
Competition  benchmarks  are  to  a  large  extent  established  on  an  international  basis  and 
management must be able to evaluate the interplay between the firm and its macroeconomic 
environment. This is critical since the macroeconomic development may have a considerable 
impact  on  corporate  cash  flows,  and  two  firms  with  similar  strategies  may  experience 
substantial differences in profitability due to divergent macroeconomic exposures.  It is the 
CFO’s task to identify the macroeconomic context and its firm-specific impact.  
Figure 2 exhibits the link between a firm’s macroeconomic environment and its cash 
flows. The figure provides a point of departure for further discussion. In column 1 the origin 
of macroeconomic uncertainty is divided into domestic and foreign policy and non-policy 
macroeconomic  shocks.  In  addition  to  the  macro-related  sources  of  disruption,  firm-  and 
industry-specific factors represent sources of uncertainty. The latter sources of uncertainty 
affect a firm’s competitiveness and must be approached with strategies and tools that differ 
from applying to macroeconomic uncertainty.   
Macroeconomic  disturbances  can,  as  showed  in  column  2,  be  divided  into  two 
categories dependent on their characteristics, more specifically monetary or aggregate real. 
One way to analyze cash flow effects of the different types of macroeconomic shocks would 
be to identify effects of these shocks on corporate cash flows. However, this is difficult to 
accomplish for several reasons. First, policy interventions in response to shocks, described in 
column 3, may distort the effects of the initial shock. Second, interventions can be either of 
monetary and/or fiscal character, as well as industrial and trade related. Third, and perhaps 
most important, it takes time to observe the nature of macroeconomic shocks even for the 
analyst who has a specific model to rely on. The task is made worse by uncertainty about the 
appropriate macroeconomic model. 
  Instead  of  linking  shocks  to  corporate  cash  flows  the  analyst  can  focus  on 
identification of relationships between market price variables shown in column 4 and cash 
flows. Changes in market price variables such as exchange rates, interest rates and inflation 8 
 
 
rates reflect changes in the macroeconomic environment and they are observable with little 
lag. Thus, the firm that can identify the effects of price variables in column 4 on cash flows in 
column 5. Thereby, macroeconomic exposures have been measured. Jointly these exposures 
constitute the exposure to macroeconomic shocks in column 1. Using exposure coefficients 
for, for example, exchange rates, interest rates and inflation, in combination with a model 
linking fundamental shocks and price variables, it is possible to create scenarios for analysis 
of the effects on cash flows of various macroeconomic shocks.  
 
Figure 2. Macroeconomic environment and the cash flow effect from shocks 
 
Source: Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2008) 
 
  When exposures to exchange rates, interest rates and inflation rates are analyzed it is 
necessary to consider that these variables tend to adjust simultaneously to underlying shocks. 
Thus,  the  price  variables  tend  to  be  correlated.  For  this  reason,  Oxelheim  and  Wihlborg 
(2008) suggest that a multivariate framework is required to identify exposure coefficients. If a 
univariate framework is used it is possible that, for example, exchange rate exposure and 
inflation exposure overlap since these variables often are correlated according to Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) theory. Similarly, interest rate exposure and exchange rate exposure may 
overlap  since  these  variables  tend  to  be  linked  by  international  capital  flows.  The 
responsiveness of these flows to domestic and foreign interest rates is reflected in the strength 
of (uncovered) interest rate parity, also called International Fisher Parity (IFP). 9 
 
 
  Once macroeconomic exposures have been identified the MUST-analysis framework 
provides a tool for analysis of the relationship between exposure of commercial operations 
and exposure of financial positions. Financial positions can be adjusted with the exposure of 
commercial  operations  as  a  benchmark  for  minimizing  total  exposure.  Alternatively, 
commercial  operations  can  be  adjusted  to  reduce  exposure  or  enhance  the  flexibility  of 
operations to changes in the environment. Finally, capital structure can be adjusted in order to 
have  a  sufficient  equity  capital  to  withstand  macroeconomic  uncertainty.  The  specific 
approach to managing exposure depends on the firm’s risk management strategy.  
  Figure  2  helps  us  to  grasp  the  complexity  of  a  CFO’s  responsibility  for  the  risk 
management strategy and for the information flows between different levels in a firm. First, 
the CFO is responsible for defining the macroeconomic context and assessing the different 
dimensions in the model in order to identify and analyze the firm-specific exposure. Second, 
identification of commercial exposure may require substantial input from heads of sales and 
purchasing. Third, the CFO must interpret and communicate the outcome to the top level 
management which then serves as the foundation for formulating the overall strategy. Fourth, 
the strategy may include objectives and instruments with respect to both financial positions 
and  commercial  operations.  The  role  of  the  CFO  as  adviser  on  corporate  strategy  was 
emphasized in the above mentioned surveys. The view presented here implies not only the 
CFO’s role as advisor but also the interdependence between the CFO’s area of responsibility 
and other areas of responsibility on the operational side.  
 
4 Formulation of a risk management strategy 
The  general  strategy  formulated  by  the  top  management  in  terms  of  objectives  of  risk 
management only serves as guidance for decisions on the tactical and operational levels. An 
operational  strategy  has  to  be  formulated  on  the  tactical  level  along  with  information 
requirements  and  the  organization  of  risk-management.  As  emphasized  by  Oxelheim  and 
Wihlborg (2008) the operational strategy should be based on the following four aspects of the 
firm’s more general strategy and objective; target variable, time horizon, risk attitude and 
management’s view on market relationships. 
  
4.1 Target variable 10 
 
 
The choice of variable for risk management must be consistent with the overall strategy and 
firm objectives expressed either in accounting or economic terms. Variables based on nominal 
accounting are in general weak determinants of shareholder value, even if equity markets 
devote much of their attention to reported earnings. 
  Assuming  that  an  economic  objective  is  chosen,  the  potential  target  variables  are 
economic value, market value, profits or cash flows. Whether a firm should target market 
value or economic value is a question of belief in market efficiency. A firm’s intrinsic, or 
economic value, should in  a long-term  perspective equal  its  market  value. A firm’s time 
horizon is in part a function of the target variable. 
 
4.2 Time horizon 
Targeting economic value or cash flows is a question of time perspective since these two 
measures converge through a firm’s cost of capital. We argue that most firms benefit from an 
extended time horizon and that the main reason to manage macroeconomic exposures in a 
short-term perspective is the risk of encountering liquidity constraints (Froot et al 1994). A 
firm experiencing financial distress or liquidity constraints need to manage its exposures on a 
short-term basis to avoid incurring losses due unanticipated cash flow changes.  
  Another  aspect  to  consider  in  the  choice  of  time  horizon  is  the  flexibility  in 
commercial operations and the statistical phenomena of mean reversion. Long-term exposures 
are less  of a  concern in an  IRM strategy since firms  with  inherent  flexibility  can utilize 
strategic real options to offset long-term exposures. We return to flexibility and real options 
below.  
  Efficiency of pricing in goods and financial markets also affect the time horizon of 
risk management. Over periods sufficiently long for PPP and IFP relationships to hold there 
are no profit opportunities in price and interest rate differentials between countries. 
 
4.3 Risk attitude 
Risk  attitude  along  with  the  management’s  view  on  market  relationships  makes  up  the 
foundation  of  our  operational  risk  management  strategies.  Risk  attitude  is  the  main 
determinant in the decision of whether a firm should manage its risk exposures or not. A risk-
neutral firm does not trade-off return and risk. It always tries to maximize expected cash 
flows or value. A risk-averse firm is prepared to sacrifice return in favor of a lower variance 
of cash flows or value. 11 
 
 
  The operational choice between risk-aversion and risk-neutrality must be determined 
considering  the  expected  loss  from  an  unanticipated  macroeconomic  outcome.  A  highly 
exposed  firm  that  is  likely  to  incur  significant  bankruptcy  costs  or  costs  of  liquidity 
constraints in case of lower tail outcomes, should consider a risk-averse approach while a firm 
with low costs associated with bankruptcy or lack of liquidity could choose a risk-neutral 
attitude. 
 
4.4 Management’s view on market price relationships 
It was noted above that the time horizon over which PPP holds affects the time horizon over 
which exchange rate risk is a concern. In this subsection we consider three financial markets 
price relationships that affect the opportunities and costs of managing currency denominations 
and maturities of financial positions and, therefore, the trade off between risk and return in 
financial markets.  
  The first financial market relationship that requires evaluation is International Fisher 
Parity  (IFP)  implying  that  there  are  no  expected  profit  opportunities  of  shifting  financial 
positions among currencies. The second relationship is the Expectations Hypothesis (EH) for 
the yield structure across maturities of financial positions in a certain currency. EH implies 
that  there  are  no  profit  opportunities  from  shifting  financial  positions  among  assets  or 
liabilities with different maturities. A long-term interest rate is simply an average of expected 
short-term interest rates over time. 
  The  third  market  relationship  affecting  risk  management  on  financial  positions  is 
Fisher Parity (FP) which implies that the expected real interest rate is independent of expected 
inflation, and that the nominal interest rate is simply the sum of these two components. If FP 
holds the maturity structure can be managed with respect to either real interest rate risk or 
inflation risk. If the relationship does not hold, inflation and real interest rates on financial 
instruments will be correlated. Thereby, real interest rate exposure and inflation exposure of 
financial instruments are not independent.   
  Risk attitude and the CFO’s view the three financial market relationships discussed 
above jointly determine important aspects of a risk management strategy that may satisfy 
corporate  objectives.  Figure  3  illustrates  how  strategies  with  respect  to  macroeconomic 
sources of risk can be classified as “Laissez-faire”, minimization of exposure, aggressive and 
selective hedging based on risk attitude and perception about efficiency of market pricing. We 
distinguish  between  strategies  with  respect  to  exchange  rate  exposure  and  interest  rate 12 
 
 
exposure  since  differences  can  exist  between  efficiency  of  domestic-  and  international 
financial markets. It is also assumed that commercial exposures are given over a specific time 
horizon.  Thereby  we  exclude  investments  in  flexibility  (real  options)  of  commercial 
operations as a risk management tool. Real options are discussed below in the next sub-
section 4.5. For simplicity we assume that inflation exposures are managed in other markets 
in order to focus on exchange rate and interest rate risk.  
The upper four boxes in Figure 3 represent strategies for managing exchange rate 
exposure. “Laissez-faire” is viable strategy for a risk-neutral firm that believes that IFP holds. 
Do nothing about currency denomination is viable because there are no profit opportunities in 
the international financial markets and the firm is not concerned with cash flow variance. The 
upside of this strategy is that a firm can focus on its core activities, which can be a valuable 
feature. A CFO of a risk-neutral  firm assuming that IFP does not hold would choose an 
aggressive strategy in Figure 3 because the CFO believes that there are profit opportunities 
based on forecasting while not having to worry about risk.  
  A CFO of a risk-averse firm who believes that IFP holds minimizes macroeconomic 
exposure  for  the  firm  by  using  financial  positions  to  offset  the  exposure  of  commercial 
operations.  Managing  exposures  of  a  risk-averse  firm  under  the  assumption  of  IFP  is  a 
relatively simple task. The complexity increases as soon as the CFO perceives that there are 
profit  opportunities  in  financial  markets.  A  selective  hedging  strategy  in  Figure  3  would 
reflect a desired trade-off between risk and return on financial positions. Ideally the trade-off 
would be determined on the top management level and translated into a selective hedging 
strategy by the CFO. This is far from a mechanical process and it requires coordination of all 
corporate financial positions. It involves a great deal of uncertainty due to the human factors 
as  well.  For  example,  hubris  with  respect  to  forecasting  ability  is  a  common  affliction. 
Internal incentives and rewards on the operational level are also important.  
  The  lower  part  of  Figure  3  refers  to  the  domestic  financial  positions  strategies  to 
manage  interest  rate  exposure  by  adjusting  the  maturity  structure  based  on  a  benchmark 
provided  by  the  interest  rate  exposure  of  commercial  operations.  The  determination  of 
“laissez-faire”, minimize exposure, aggressive and selective hedging strategies with respect to 
interest rate risk is analogous to the determination of strategy with respect to exchange rate 
risk except that it is perceptions about EH instead of IFP that must be considered. Deviations 
from EH implies that there are potential profit opportunities in the adjustment of maturity 13 
 
 
structure.  In  addition  to  EH,  we  also  consider  perceptions  about  FP  in  interest  rate  risk 




Figure 3. Comprehensive macroeconomic risk management strategies 
Market  Management’s 
view on the 
market 
Risk attitude 




IFP  “Laissez faire” with 
respect to currency 
denomination 
Minimize exposure to 
exchange rate uncertainty 
  Non-IFP  Aggressive strategy with 
respect to currency 
denomination 





EH  FP  Laissez faire with respect 
to maturity structure and 
interest rate adjustability 
Minimize exposure to real 
interest rate exposure 
    Non-
FP 
  Minimize exposure 
considering real interest rate 




FP  Aggressive strategy with 
respect to maturity 
structure and interest rate 
adjustability 
Selective hedging of real 
interest rate exposure 
    Non-
FP 
  Selective hedging considering 




Note: Laissez-faire implies that currency denomination and maturity structure are determines 
entirely by the most favorable transaction fees and spreads offered to the specific firm in the 
market. 
Source: Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2008) 
 
of inflation movements. In this case, interest rate risk management can be oriented towards 
either  inflation  risk  or  real  interest  rate  risk  while,  if  IFP  does  not  hold,  the  correlation 
between inflation rates and interest rates must be considered in order to effectively manage 
exposures. The complexity of risk management is increased if FP cannot be assumed. 
 
4.5 Management of commercial operations; Flexibility and real options 
The  exposure  management  strategies  discussed  so  far  have  been  based  on  the 
assumption that the exposure of commercial operations is given and that financial positions 
are  taken  to  reduce  the  total  exposure  if  so  desired.  There  is  an  obvious  substitutability 
between hedging with financial contracts and adjustment of commercial operations, however. 
Over  time  horizons  when  there  is  adjustability  of  commercial  operations  in  different 
dimensions, risk management by means of financial positions may not be the best strategy for 
dealing with exposure. We elaborate on such instruments here.  
An important aspect of these instruments is that they often can be thought of as “real” 
options that enable a firm to both reduce exposure and increase expected profits. Thus, they 
are not only substitutes for financial instruments but complements as well, and they should be 
considered by all firms regardless of risk attitude. Deviations from PPP can be long lasting 
and affect the profitability of a firm’s operations to such an extent that the viability of the 
operations is threatened by such factors as low domestic currency prices on exported outputs, 
high costs of imported inputs, or lack of competitiveness in the market relative to foreign 
producers. Over longer time horizons when PPP holds, there is no exchange rate risk but there 
may be exposure of commercial operations owing to uncertainty about relative prices among 
outputs and inputs. In general, exposure to price differences between outputs and inputs can 
be  managed  by  adjustment  of  commercial  operations  in  different  dimensions.  Such 
adjustment is generally costly, however. Principles for managing such exposure have been 
developed  theoretically  by  applying  the  theory  of  option  pricing.  The  ability  to  move  a 
production site from one country to another, to shift from a supplier in one country to a 
supplier in another country, to abandon a market where losses mount, and to enter a new 15 
 
 
market where profits are expected are all “options” that can be exercised at a cost. By creating 
flexibility of operations in different dimensions, these costs can be reduced, enabling the firm 
to better take advantage of profit opportunities. Thus, exposure management by means of 
commercial operations affects the firm’s profitability as well as its exposure to real exchange 
rate changes and relative price shifts (Capel 1997).  
The  multinational  firm  with  production  units  in  more  than  one  country  can  shift 
production from one country to another (if spare capacity exists), when relative labor costs 
change  as  a  result  of  exchange  rate  changes  (see  Kogut  and  Kulatilaka  1994).  In  many 
industries, the hindrances to such shifts are substantial either because of non-standardization 
of products or because of labor relations in producing units. A more valuable option for many 
firms would be to expand purchases of inputs from suppliers in countries with favorable real 
exchange rates and reduce purchases from others. 
Abandoning markets where losses are made is also associated with costs, if the firm 
hopes to reenter in the future. Customer relations may be hurt and there are costs associated 
with  reentry  and  regaining  market  share  (Oxelheim  et  al,  1990).  The  costs  of  entering  a 
market the first time are likely to be even higher. Thus, to either abandon or enter a new 
market is generally not worthwhile for small relative price changes even if a conventional 
project  evaluation  would  indicate  that  the  changes  are  profitable.  The  reason  why 
conventional project evaluation techniques fail to give the correct signals is that they do not 
take into account that, under uncertainty, reversals of decisions may become necessary and 
there are costs specifically related to these reversals. Thus, when there is uncertainty about 
real exchange rates and relative prices there is “a band of inaction”; within this band current 
operations continue unchanged even if losses occur. 
The  “options”  associated  with  adjustability  of  commercial  operations  are  more 
valuable as the uncertainty about real exchange rates and relative prices increases. They are 
also more valuable if the irreversible costs of changes can be reduced. Thus, high uncertainty 
makes flexibility or adjustability more valuable because it enables the firm to take advantage 
of  profit  opportunities  in  commercial  operations.  For  example,  spreading  input  purchases 
among suppliers in different countries reduces the costs of expanding these purchases in the 
country with the most favorable exchange rates. 
The firm’s rule for responses to changes in exchange rates, interest rates, and other 
sources  of  cost  changes  constitute  the  firm’s  pricing  strategy.  Commercial  exposure  is 
strongly  influenced  by  this  strategy.  Increased  uncertainty  in  exchange  rates  and  the 16 
 
 
macroeconomic environment can make it worthwhile to change the pricing strategy in order 
to allow greater flexibility and greater pass-through. The benefits of adjusting prices to levels 
that lead to higher short-run profits under different circumstances must be weighed against the 
costs of not being able to offer customers a stable price. To some extent the price adjustment 
to changes in, for example, exchange rates can be predetermined in contracts. Trade credit 
terms  can  also  include  payment  adjustment  in  response  to  inflation  and  exchange  rate 
changes. The use of such adjustment clauses is not unusual (see Oxelheim et al 1990). 
The  general  implication  of  this  discussion  is  that  flexibility  and  adjustability  of 
operations and pricing are exposure management tools which, to be worthwhile, require a 
minimum degree of uncertainty about future prices. If uncertainty is high, however, there are 
reasons to invest in the ability to adjust operations even in the short run, thereby reducing the 
need for exposure management by financial positioning and increasing expected profits. Over 
the longer term the costs of adjustability can be diminished, because options are “built in” by 
the need to replace assets and  individuals. Over such horizons, exposure management by 
adjustment of financial positions is superfluous (see Trigeorgis 1996; Amran and Kulatilaka 
1999; Copeland and Antikarov 2001). 
 
5 Exposure strategies and information requirements 
In this section we first consider the information requirements associated with the financial risk 
management  strategies  described  in  Figure  3.  Thereafter,  we  turn  to  the  additional 
requirements  associated  with  flexibility  of  commercial  operations.  Finally  we  turn  to 
information requirements associated with evaluation and organization of risk management. 
 
5.1 Financial risk management strategy and information requirements 
Besides  the  operational  variables  and  in  particularly,  risk  attitude  and  market  price 
relationships,  an  exposure  strategy  has  to  be  built  on  an  adequate  information  system 
supporting  the  strategic  approach.  An  exposure  strategy  undermined  by  an  insufficient 
information  supply  may  create  more  costs  than  benefits.  In  Figure  4  we  outline  the 
information requirements for the strategies discussed in Figure 3. 
  Risk neutral strategies are relatively straightforward and the information requirements 
are  in  return  very  limited.    Implementing  and  exploiting  a  laissez-faire  strategy  requires 
information about transaction costs; bid-ask spreads and fees, but forecasting and estimation 
of variances and covariances are not needed since currency denomination and maturities are 17 
 
 
found irrelevant. If the IFP and/or EH do not hold then forecasting profit opportunities is 
required to implement an aggressive strategy but the risk neutral firm does not need exposure 
and risk information.  
  Risk management strategies based on a risk-averse attitude are both more complex and 
in need of more information. A “minimize variance” strategy requires exposure coefficients 
(multivariate  exposure  coefficients  from  the  MUST-analysis)  concerning  commercial 
exposures and financial positions even if market relationships are supposed to hold. This 
information  requirement  based  on  the  perception  that  markets  do  not  allow  profit 
opportunities  is  still  modest  relative  to  the  information  needed  to  implement  a  selective 
hedging strategy efficiently.  
Selective hedging is based on risk-aversion and the belief of the CFO that forecasting 
of exchange rates and interest rates offers profit opportunities. Information with respect to 
forecasting must be complemented with variances and co-variances for financial positions. In 
practice, most CFOs do not believe in the parities hold and they typically state that they are 
risk averse. Thus, they are in need the most extensive information requirements specified in 
Figure 4. Not only do they need variance-covariance information, they also need information 
about how to trade off risk and return. Most often rules of thumb are used to set exposure 
limits with respect to risky currency positions and interest rate risk.  
In spite of the formidable information requirements for the risk averse firm that rejects 
IFP  and  EH,  we  cannot  exclude  the  value  of  employing  a  risk-averse  strategy  under  the 
circumstances  where  adverse  macroeconomic  outcomes  can  seriously  hurt  a  firm  by 
increasing the probability of bankruptcy or the likelihood of liquidity constraints.  
  Information costs must be evaluated on strictly economic grounds. Thus, information 
costs must be compared with the expected gains from being able to trading off risk and return. 
Information costs can be evaluated relative to the expected costs of a worst case scenario 
outcome under a laissez-faire strategy. An additional consideration is that relatively complex 
strategies increase the likelihood of mismanagement if incentive structures are not appropriate 
and all the relevant information is not available. 
 
5.2 Real options and information implications  
Inclusion  of  real  options  in  risk  management  increases  complexity  and  information 
requirements.  In  addition  to  the  requirements  already  described  above,  investments  in 
flexibility  of  business  operation  need  evaluation  and  once  real  options  are  in  place  the 18 
 
 
flexibility  implies  that  the  exposure  of  commercial  operations  may  suddenly  increase  or 
decrease when an option is exercised.  The latter consideration is relevant, in particular, when 
the firm only has a few “large” real options, such as the possibility of moving a large share of 
production from one location to another. In the more typical case the firm may have a large 
number of smaller options that kick in one by one when, for example, the exchange rate or the 
interest  rate  continues  to  move  further  away  from  “normal”  levels.  The  exposure  of 
commercial operations should be easier to predict for the firm with a large number of small 
real options. Without such information the benchmark exposure for financial management is 
uncertain. 
 
Figure  4.  Information  requirements  in  comprehensive  macroeconomic  risk  management 
strategies 
Market  Management’s 
view on the 
market 
Risk attitude 




IFP  - 
 
Commercial exposure to exchange 
rates. 
Exposure of financial positions. 
  Non-IFP  Exchange rate 
forecasts (relative 
to interest rate 
differentials) 
Exposure coefficients (See Oxelheim 
and Wihlborg 2008). 
Exchange rate forecasts. 





EH  FP  -  Commercial and financial interest 
rate exposure coefficients as above. 
    Non-
FP 
-  Interest rate exposure coefficients as 
above. 
Inflation exposure coefficients. 
Interest rate-inflation correlations. 
  Non-
EH 
FP  Interest rate 
forecasts over the 
maturity spectrum 
Interest rate exposures as above. 
Interest rate forecasts. 
Interest rate variances and 
correlations across markets. 19 
 
 
    Non-
FP 
Interest rate 
forecasts over the 
maturity spectrum 
Interest rate exposure coefficients as 
above. 
Inflation exposure coefficients. 
Inflation forecasts. 
Inflation variances and correlations 
across maturities. 
Inflation-interest rate correlations. 
Note: All strategies require information about transaction-fees and bid-ask spreads in addition 
to the information listed above. 
 
Source: Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2008) 
 
  Investments  in  real  options  also  have  a  soft  dimension  since  flexibility  may  be 
associated with costs in terms of relations with customers and suppliers. 
  The complexity of real option evaluation as well as exposure measurement when there 
is substantial flexibility implies that the perfect risk management strategy is unattainable for 
most  firms.  Simplifying  assumptions  and  adjustments  must  be  made.  In  our  view,  an 
appropriate way of running an IRM or MUST strategy without facing too much complexity 
and excessive information requirements is to estimate the exposures of commercial operations 
to macroeconomic variables and to use these exposures as benchmarks for financial positions.  
The  uncertainty  about  the  exposures  does  not  mean  that  the  estimates  are  useless.  The 
exposures can be checked against knowledge about corporate operations and re-estimated on 
a  quarterly  or  annual  basis.  If  the  firm  undergoes  important  structural  changes  historical 
exposure data may lose relevance. In this case scenario analysis of exposure may be superior 
to statistical techniques. 
 
5.3 Evaluation of strategies and organization of risk management   
In this section we are concerned with the question whether the success of a risk management 
strategy can be evaluated ex post. From a shareholder perspective the ultimate objective of 
risk management would be to lower the firm’s cost of capital but this cost is not directly 
observable and even if it can be observed it is difficult to identify effects of risk management.  
  There are serious pitfalls when evaluating risk management strategies ex post. These 
pitfalls can be the result of confusion between the risk concept that should be used from the 
perspective of general corporate objectives and the proxy for risk that can be measured. Risk 
is fundamentally an unobservable, forward looking variable. For ex post measurement the 
time horizon is an important factor and a source of misleading ex post measures of risk. 20 
 
 
Management’s risk aversion may refer to uncertainty over a specific time horizon while risk is 
measured ex post as the variance of cash flows or value over a certain period. In this case, risk 
management  is  concerned  with  a  conditional  variance  while  the  measured  risk  is  an 
unconditional variance. Only if management’s risk concern is the actual variance of cash flow 
or value is it possible to directly observe how risk management has performed. 
  The fact that risk is an expectation about the future implies that an observation of a 
large loss caused by, for example exchange rate changes, is not in itself evidence of a failure 
of measuring and managing risk. Nevertheless, arguments about failed risk management are 
often based on such “tail” observations. 
  The difficulty of evaluating risk management performance in hindsight implies that 
incentives of those involved in risk management must be considered carefully. For example, it 
is common that the CFO is evaluated based on the performance of the finance division as a 
profit center. If at the same time the CFO is the person deciding on risk management strategy 
in a risk averse corporation, there is an obvious conflict between the corporate objective and 
the incentives of the CFO. 
  Incentives of the CFO as well as of risk managers on the operational level are also 
linked to the organization of risk management. Organization affects information flows as well 
as incentives. An increased tendency towards centralization has been observed over the last 
few decades. This tendency can be explained by scale advantages when buying and selling 
currencies, opportunities for netting within a multidivisional firm, the scarcity of expertise on 
the local level in a multinational firm, advantages of centralized tax planning and avoidance 
of  exchange  controls  on  a  centralized  level.  Centralization  also  enables  the  firm  to  take 
advantage of differences in financial transactions costs among markets. 
  In general centralization refers to decisions being made in entities with independent 
bankruptcy risk and independent access to credit markets, while decisions are made on lower 
levels  without coordination in  a decentralized organization.  If the CFO of a consolidated 
multinational or multi-product firm is responsible for risk management then we can say that 
there is centralized responsibility. On the other hand, if the CFO is responsible for financial 
positions only while, for example, the head of sales conducts risk management with respect to 
commercial operations there is a degree of decentralization. Decentralization can also take the 
form  that  financial  risk  management  responsibilities  are  assigned  to  local  or  product 
subsidiaries.  21 
 
 
  An evaluation program for macroeconomic risk management should naturally include 
an  evaluation  of  its  organization  and  of  performance  relative  to  objectives  with  different 
degrees  of centralization. Advantages  of  centralization may have to  be  traded off  against 
advantages  of  decentralization  in  the  form  of  information  availability  or  motivation  of 
managers on the operational level.  
  One  way  of  achieving  advantages  of  decentralization  is  to  use  internal  prices  in 
budgeting and performance evaluation. Internal exchange rates and interest rates can be set by 
the central finance function while local entities remain profit centers and evaluated at internal 
exchange  rates  and  interest  rates.  Risk  management  objectives  can  be  in  conflict  with 
profitability objectives, however, as noted above. Risk-taking responsibilities are, therefore, 
not easily decentralized in a firm with overall objectives that include the variance of cash 
flows or value. One way to resolve the dilemma is to let decentralized entities sell financial 
positions to the central finance function at internal prices while the central finance function 
takes responsibility for the consolidated exposures to macroeconomic sources of risk.  
  One issue of concern from an organizational and informational point of view is that 
exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty is not purely a financial issue. We have emphasized 
the exposure of commercial operations as one aspect of macroeconomic risk management. If 
the exposure of commercial operations can be taken as given and not considered an area of 
risk management, the CFO can take responsibility for management of all macroeconomic risk 
by estimating the exposure of commercial operations and take this exposure a benchmark for 
financial risk management.  
  Business areas, head of sales and head of purchasing may deal on their own with 
commercial  cash  flow  exposures  to  macroeconomic  variables,  however.  Investments  in 
flexibility (real options) are often value increasing for these divisions. These real options 
create complexity from a risk management point of view. Since, real options tend to be value 
increasing if there is substantial macroeconomic uncertainty, it is desirable to have strong 
incentives to invest in flexibility. These investments affect commercial cash flow exposure 
and they create uncertainty about future cash flow exposures. These exposures will vary over 
time  as  a  result  of  adjustments  of  business  operations  in  response  to  changes  in  the 
macroeconomic  environment.  The  exposure  uncertainty  makes  the  task  of  the  CFO  to 
measure and manage commercial cash flow exposure more complex.  
  One approach to the information problem created by investment in real options is to 
limit the CFO’s responsibility to management of exposures of financial positions while the 22 
 
 
business divisions take responsibility for remaining exposures. In this case there is no one 
taking responsibility for overall exposure, however. 
  Another approach is to have the CFO responsible for total exposure while recognizing 
that  measures  of  commercial  exposure  are  uncertain  as  a  result  of  real  options.  This 
uncertainty  can  managed  to  some  extent  by  the  use  of  financial  options  as  hedging 
instruments.  
    A third approach is to combine the second approach with the creation of a 
centralized risk management group as envisioned by ERM and IRM. This group would not be 
directly  responsible  for  operational  risk  management  decisions  but  serve  informational, 
coordinating and organizational roles.  Risk management activities of the different parts of the 
firm would be coordinated and information flows among them would be made easier. The 
organizational  roles  would  be  to  determine  how  and  where  to  assign  responsibilities  for 




In  this  chapter  we  have  examined  the  information  requirements  for  macroeconomic  risk 
management within a comprehensive risk management strategy from a CFO’s perspective. 
The strategic framework we developed is based on operational corporate objectives derived 
from the overall financial- and commercial strategies of a firm.  
  The  choice  of  macroeconomic  risk  management  strategy  can  be  divided  into  two 
issues. One is the ability to adjust commercial operations and pricing to take advantage of 
profit  opportunities  by  means  of  investments  in  real  options.  The  second  issue  involves 
strategy  choice  when  adjustability  is  low.  In  the  latter  case,  the  strategy  can  focus  on 
adjustment of financial positions with the exposure of commercial operations as benchmark. 
We have proposed a set of risk management strategies for macroeconomic risk along with the 
information requirements within the finance function.   
  The  strategy  for  using  financial  positions  to  reduce  or  offset  the  macroeconomic 
exposure of commercial operations can be viewed as a task for the CFO using information 
from the top level with respect to the general objectives of the firm and to acceptance of risk. 
The factors that determine a desirable strategy with respect to value or cash flows are time 
horizon,  risk  attitude  and  perceptions  about  efficiency  of  pricing  in  financial  and  goods 
markets. We show that if the CFO of a risk averse firm perceives that market’s pricing makes 23 
 
 
it possible to beat the market, requirements on information systems are very high and possibly 
impossible to satisfy.  
  Evaluation  and  organization  of  risk  management  are  important  for  incentives  and 
information flows. The creation of a centralized risk management group as envisioned by 
ERM and IRM is particularly important in firms where risk is strongly affected by flexibility 
of business operations, since financial risk management is inseparable from decisions made 
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